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THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE:
"ITS HOUR COME ROUND AT LAST"?
PHILIP B. KURLAND*
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity . . .
And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches toward Bethlehem to be born?**
It ought not to be surprising that a symposium concerned with cele-
brating the hundredth anniversary of the fourteenth amendment should
concentrate, as the three other papers here in fact do, on the equal pro-
tection clause. Certainly equal protection of the laws has been at the
heart of the developing constitutional jurisprudence of the last two
decades. Certainly, too, for the same reason, a similar celebration of
the fiftieth or seventy-fifth anniversaries of the fourteenth amendment
would have focused on the due process clause.
I would not, if I could, detract from the importance of the theses of
my fellow participants by suggesting that anything has yet happened
in the decisions of the Supreme Court, the prime arbiter of the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment, that should cause us to turn our atten-
tion away from the conceptions of equality that in recent years have
been the most potent, if not the most cogent, forces in giving new
meaning to the basic text.
What I propose here is to indulge, at the invitation of my hosts, I
would quickly add, the most hazardous and least justifiable of activities
that can be undertaken by a law professor: ruminations about the dis-
tant future. It is exactly because law-and especially constitutional
law-is so far from a science, that prognostication is the least justifiable
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. A.B., 1942, University
of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1944, Harvard Law School.
** W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming (1921).
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and most hazardous of activities for a law professor. Small as is the
expertise that anyone can claim as a constitutional scholar, that claim
is best rested on analysis of what has occurred rather than prediction
of what will occur. Political scientists may reduce problems to sta-
tistical data and so manipulate the future as well as the past. So, too,
perhaps, can the "new breed" of constitutional lawyers. But it ill be-
hooves one brought up in the tradition of Thomas Reed Powell and
Felix Frankfurter, names long out of fashion in the groves of academe,
to look into his crystal ball and pretend to derive knowledge therefrom.
Nevertheless, with a courage-like much courage-that is born of ig-
norance, my thesis in essence is that at the next noteworthy anniversary
of the fourteenth amendment, it will be the privileges or immunities
clause, placed first among section one's grand restraints on govern-
ment, that will be the center of attention. That clause, as you all
know, reads: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
I would remind you immediately-not that it has made any differ-
ence to the Supreme Court-that only the privileges or immunities
clause speaks to matters of substance; certainly the language of due
process and equal protection does not.
I. LOOKING BACKWARD
It is often helpful, if you want to know where you are going, to look
back to see where you have been and to look around to see where you
are. In the case of the fourteenth amendment's privileges and immu-
nities clause, however, the landscape in all directions seems barren of
distinguishing features.
Naturally, the thought comes that we might determine the intent
and function of the clause by resort to the legislative history that
brought it into existence. This helps us only to know that the lan-
guage may be traced back to the fourth article and from there back to
the Articles of Confederation.1 But in those documents they were
addressing the rights of citizens of the states rather than of the United
States.
1. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2:
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Im-
munities of Citizens in the several states.
AnT. CONFED. art. IV:
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The legislative history of this provision of the amendment, in Con-
gress, is otherwise about as revealing as the legislative history of the
equal protection clause. By that I mean that it affords a license to take
anything from it that the interpreter wishes to put in it. If recent
scholarship on the fourteenth amendment has revealed anything, it
has revealed that in this area truth, like beauty, lies in the eyes of the
beholder. The primary rules for construction are two: (1) The lan-
guage does not mean what it says. (2) The language does not say
what it means. With these tools at hand, the conclusion is readily
reached that any clause was intended to have the broadest effect or that
it was intended to have no effect at all.
The proposition for this form of constitutional interpretation has been
put most felicitously by Charles Fairman in his recent book on the his-
tory of the Supreme Court. There, relying on Celsus, Kent, Marshall,
and Taney, Professor Fairman wrote:
To know the laws, it was written of old, is not merely to hold to their
words, but to comprehend as well their force and power. A peculiar
wisdom is needed to expound the Constitution-a charter intended to
endure for ages to come and to be adequate to the unfolding needs of
a nation. Its underlying reason may govern situations not present to
the mind when the text was framed; the particular application with
which a general provision was identified at the outset should not so
limit its future operation as to produce a public inconvenience-no-
tably when this would deny that perfect equality of rights among citi-
zens which the Constitution contemplates .... 2
This means that there is leave for the present generation to give such
meaning to constitutional provisions as may not be interdicted by the
specificity of the language. Thirty-five years of age may be difficult to
manipulate as a qualification for presidential office. But due process,
privileges or immunities, equal protection of the laws are phrases with-
out any intrinsic limitations.
Probably the most significant legislative history with reference to the
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants
of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice ex-
cepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in
the several States ....
2. C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, PART ONE, at 1301
(1971) (published as vol. VI of the HISroRy OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED
STATES) (emphasis original).
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privileges or immunities clause may be found in the attempt by Senator
Reverdy Johnson to strike it from the proposed amendment. He said:
I am decidedly in favor of the first part of the section which defines
what citizenship shall be, and in favor of that part of the section which
denies to a State the right to deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, but I think it quite objection-
able to provide [the privileges and immunities clause], simply because
I do not understand what will be the effect of that.3
Again, Professor Fairman admirably summed up the situation:
Johnson's opposition is not to be classed with that of Garrett Davis,
a wrangler, nor even with that of Senator Hendricks. Johnson saw
constitutional provisions as they would appear at the Supreme Court
bar. He had participated in the Joint Committee, he had heard How-
ard's presentation-and he still did not understand what the effect of
the clause would be. Coming from him, that amounted to a certificate
that, for the purposes of litigation, the privileges and immunities clause
did not have a definite meaning.4
With legislative history as a guide, the privileges or immunities clause
took the form of a blank check. But, it quickly turned out, it was a
blank check drawn on an account without funds.
The judicial history of the privileges or immunities clause is almost
as uninforming as is the legislative history. For the most part, it tells
us what the privileges or immunities are not rather than what they are.
Although some think the judicial history should begin with Crandall v.
Nevada,5 it must be recognized that the decision preceded the effectua-
tion of the fourteenth amendment by several months. 6 And in any
event, the Court did not, in establishing the freedom of the United
States citizen from restraints on travel by way of an exit tax, rely upon
the language of the fourteenth amendment. The commencement of
the judicial history of privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States lies in the Slaughter-House Cases,7 which provided both a begin-
ning and an end.
Mr. Justice Bradley, it will be recalled, was a "new boy" when he sat
3. Quoted in id. at 1297.
4. Id.
5. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
6. The decision in Crandall was handed down during the December Term, 1867,
and the fourteenth amendment was certified by the Secretary of State on July 28,
1868.
7. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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on the case on circuit. He saw the privileges or immunities clause
in rather grandiose proportions. Indeed, he wrote of the origins of the
privileges or immunities clause (much as Professor Bickels was later to
write of the origins of the equal protection clause):
The new prohibition that "no state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States" is not identical with the clause in the constitution which
declared that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens of the several states." It embraces
much more.
It is possible that those who framed the article were not themselves
aware of the far reaching character of its terms. They may have had
in mind but one particular phase of social and political wrong which
they desired to redress. Yet, if the amendment, as framed and ex-
pressed, does in fact bear a broader meaning, and does extend its
protecting shield over those who were never thought of when it was
conceived and put in form, and does reach social evils which were
never before prohibited by constitutional enactment, it is to be pre-
sumed that the American people, in giving it their imprimatur, under-
stood what they were doing, and meant to decree what has in fact
been decreed.
What, then, are the essential privileges which belong to a citizen
of the United States, as such, and which a state cannot by its laws
invade? It may be difficult to enumerate or define them. The
supreme court, on one occasion, thought it unwise to do so. [Conner v.
Elliot] 18 How. [59 U.S.] 591. But so far as relates to the question
in hand, we may safely say it is one of the privileges of every American
citizen to adopt and follow such lawful industrial pursuit-not injurious
to the community-as he may see fit ....
There is no more sacred right of citizenship than the right to pursue
unmolested a lawful employment in a lawful manner. It is nothing
more nor less than the sacred right of labor.9
The reading given by Bradley sounds like question begging, because
it speaks of "lawful employment in a lawful manner" and the question
how lawfulness is to be determined is unresolved. But that is true of
8. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HA.v. L. REv. 1 (1955).
9. Live-Stock Dealers' and Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Slaughter-House Co.,
15 F. Cas. 649, 652 (No. 8408) (C.C.D. La. 1870).
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many of our grand constitutional propositions. Bradley meant that
the federal courts, not the states, should determine what is lawful and
what is not lawful on such criteria as they would adduce from time to
time and from case to case.
The case was argued in the Supreme Court, as it had been in the
circuit court, by John A. Campbell, a former Justice of the Supreme
Court who had resigned when his home state of Alabama seceded from
the Union. Part of the argument is instructive because the conditions
it describes are closer to our own times than to those of the post-Civil
War era. According to the reporter:
The learned counsel quoting Thiers, contended that "the right to
one's self, to one's own faculties, physical and intellectual, one's own
brain, eyes, hands, feet, in a word to his soul and body, was an incon-
testable right; one of whose enjoyment and exercise by its owner no
one could complain, and one which no one could take away. More
than this, the obligation to labor was a duty, a thing ordained of God,
and which if submitted to faithfully, secured a blessing to the human
family." Quoting further from Turgot, De Tocqueville, Buckle, Dalloz,
Leiber, Sir G. C. Lewis, and others, the counsel gave a vivid and very
interesting account of the condition and grievances of the lower orders
in various countries of Europe, especially in France, with its banalits
and "seigneurs justiciers," during those days when "the prying eye of
the government followed the butcher to the shambles and the baker to
the oven;" when "the peasant could not cross a river without paying
to some nobleman a toll, nor take the produce which he raised to
market until he had bought leave to do so; nor consume what re-
mained of his grain till he had sent it to the lord's mill to be ground,
nor fill his cloths on his own works, nor sharpen his tools at his own
grindstone, nor make wine, oil, or cider at his own press;" the days of
monopolies; monopolies which followed men in their daily avocations,
troubled them with its meddling spirit, and worst of all diminished their
responsibility to themselves.10
Campbell then pushed for the most expansive of readings for the
fourteenth amendment in general and the privileges or immunities
clause in particular. He would have read it as a nationalization of
the existing federalism:
The doctrine of the "States-Rights party," led in modem times by Mr.
Calhoun, was, that there was no citizenship in the whole United
10. The argument of counsel is included in the official report. Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 45 (1873).
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States, except sub modo and by the permission of the States. Ac-
cording to their theory the United States had no integral existence ex-
cept as an incomplete combination among several integers. The four-
teenth amendment struck at, and forever destroyed, all such doctrines.
It seems to have been made under an apprehension of a destructive
faculty in the State governments. It consolidated the several "in-
tegers" into a consistent whole. Were there Brahmans in Massa-
chusetts, "the chief of all creatures, and with the universe held in
charge for them," and Soudras in Pennsylvania, "who simply had life
through the benevolence of the other," this amendment places them
on the same footing. By it the national principle has received an
indefinite enlargement. The tie between the United States and every
citizen in every part of its own jurisdiction has been made intimate
and familiar. To the same extent the confederate features of the
government have been obliterated. The States in their closest connec-
tion with the members of the State, have been placed under the over-
sight and restraining and enforcing hand of Congress. The purpose
is manifest, to establish through the whole jurisdiction of the United
States ONE PEOPLE, and that every member of the empire shall under-
stand and appreciate the fact that his privileges and immunities can-
not be abridged by State authority; that State laws must be so framed
as to secure life, liberty, property from arbitrary violation and secure
protection of law to all. Thus, as the great personal rights of each and
every person were established and guarded, a reasonable confidence
that there would be good government might seem to be justified. The
amendment embodies all that the statesmanship of the country has
conceived for accommodating the Constitution and the institutions of
the country to the vast additions of territory, increase of the popula-
tion, multiplication of States and Territorial governments, the annual
influx of aliens, and the mighty changes produced by revolutionary
events, and by social, industrial, commercial development. It is an
act of Union, an act to determine the reciprocal relations of the mil-
lions of population within the bounds of the United States-the nu-
merous State governments and the entire United States administered
by a common government-that they might mutually sustain, support,
and co-operate for the promotion of peace, security and the assurance
of property and liberty. ...
To the State governments it says: "Let there be no law made or
enforced to diminish one of the privileges and immunities of the people
of the United States;" nor law to deprive them of their life, liberty,
property, or protection without trial. To the people the declaration
is: "Take and hold this your certificate of status and of capacity,
Vol. 1972:405]
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the Magna Charta of your rights and liberties." To the Congress it
says: "Take care to enforce this article by suitable laws."'"
The Supreme Court made short shrift of Campbell's arguments on be-
half of an expansive interpretation of the privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment. It held that rights of national
citizenship, as distinct from state citizenship, were few: the express
limitations of the Constitution, such as the rule against ex post facto
laws; the right to travel expressed in Crandall; the claim on the protec-
tion of the national government while on the high seas or in foreign
countries; the right of assembly and to petition for redress of grievances;
the privilege of habeas corpus; the right to access to navigable waters;
rights created by treaty; and such rights as were otherwise guaranteed
by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments, including the
right to state citizenship by bona fide establishment of residence in a
state.
The one thing that was clear to Mr. Justice Miller, who wrote on be-
half of a bare majority of five, was that it was not "intended to bring
within the power of the Congress the entire domain of civil rights here-
tofore belonging exclusively to the States."' 2  "We are convinced," he
wrote, "that no such results were intended by the Congress which pro-
posed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States which
ratified them."'"
Mr. Justice Field wrote for a minority including Chief Justice Chase,
and Justices Swayne and Bradley. These three of Abraham Lincoln's
appointees and one of Grant's were prepared to catalogue some of the
privileges and immunities intended to be protected and to generalize
about others. The list Field derived from the Civil Rights Act
included the rights: "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey
real and personal property, and to full and equal benefits of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property."' 4  The
more general, Field took from an interpretation given to the fourth
article in Corfield v. Coryell,'3 where Mr. Justice Washington, on cir-
cuit, said that he had "no hesitation in confining these expressions to
11. Id. at 52-55.
12. Id. at 77.
13. Id. at 78.
14. id. at 91.
15. 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
[Vol. 1972:405
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those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments. .... -16
These included "protection by the government; the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every
kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject neverthe-
less to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the
general good of the whole." 7
Of these events, Professor Corwin has appropriately written:
"Unique among constitutional provisions, the privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment enjoys the distinction of having
been rendered a 'practical nullity' by a single decision of the Supreme
Court rendered within five years after its ratification."'18 If the clause
is in repose, it is not yet dead. However little invoked, acknowledg-
ments of its authority have not infrequently been made. In Twining
v. New Jersey,'9 itself but one of the many opinions overturned by the
Warren Court, the Court was able to list among the privileges and im-
munities of national citizenship: the right of passage from state to
state; the right to petition Congress to redress grievances; the right to
vote for national officers; the right to enter public lands; the right to
be protected against violence while in the custody of the government;
the right to inform the United States about violations of its laws. One
can add to these, depending on how one reads Hague v. CIO,2  the
right to use public parks and streets for peaceable assembly, a right
that has long since been taken over by the first amendment as applied
to the states through the fourteenth; and possibly the right to own
property, depending on how one reads Oyama v. California.2'
For the most part, the Supreme Court decisions since Slaughter-
House have rejected attempts to invoke the privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment. In 1935, Mr. Justice Stone, as
he then was, dissenting in Colgate v. Harvey,22 which was overruled
five years later,23 said: "Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
16. Id. at 551.
17. Id. at 551-52.
18. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 965 (E. Corwin ed.
1953).
19. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
20. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
21. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
22. 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
23. Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940).
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ment at least forty-four cases have been brought to this Court in which
state statutes have been assailed as infringements of the privileges and
immunities clause. Until today none has held that state legislation in-
fringed that clause."'2 - Many of the decisions, however, like those re-
jecting claims to a right to jury trial and against poll taxes, have since
been made obsolete by rulings that other provisions of the Constitution
protect what is not protected by the privileges or immunities clause.
II. CAUSES OF QUIESENCE
With this knowledge of the history of the privileges or immunities
clause comes the challenge to explain its failure to provide a base for
substantial constitutional developments. The essential answer must be
that it has failed because other provisions and events have succeeded
in accomplishing what might have been the functions of this clause.
If, as was the case with some of the Radicals of the reconstruction
era, it was hoped that the provisions of the privileges or immunities
clause of the fourteenth amendment would nationalize the law by re-
moving from the states to the national government the regulation of the
affairs of American citizens, that function has long since been accom-
plished by other means. Federalism is dead, if by federalism we mean
the retention by the states of areas of government in which they are
sovereign. Thus, the grandest of the ambitions for the clause has been
attained without it.
If one saw the privileges and immunities clause as a means to estab-
lish a constitutional doctrine of laissez-faire with regard to industrial
and commercial activities, that too was accomplished, for an era, but
through the due process clause. What Justice Field and his minority
failed to secure by way of the privileges or immunities clause in the
Slaughter-House Cases, Field and his henchman certainly accomplished
by way of due process decisions in the years immediately following
the Slaughter-House decision.
The privileges or immunities clause might have been read in narrow
compass to assure the dominance of federal judicial and legislative
power. But if its function was to assure the dominance of those rules
made by the national courts and by the Congress that created privileges
and immunities, the supremacy clause proved adequate to that task.
It has been cogently argued that the incorporation theory, by which
24. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 445-46 (1935) (dissenting opinion).
[Vol. 1972:405
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the privileges and immunities of the several provisions of the Bill of
Rights have been made applicable to the states, would have most
logically been accomplished by use of the privileges or immunities
clause. After all, what better definition of national privileges and im-
munities than those specified as protections for its citzenry against the
national government itself? It is possible that for some the clause was
deemed inhospitable because by its language it confined its protection
to citizens, while the equal protection clause and the due process clause
afford sanctuary for all persons, including corporations, which the
Supreme Court had specifically held to be outside the ambit of the
privileges or immunities clause. As we all know, incorporation of
most of the first eight amendments has been accomplished, but without
the need for reliance on the privileges or immunities clause.
To the extent that the privileges or immunities clause might have
afforded a base for equality of treatment of citizens, black and white,
one of the arguments proffered in Slaughter-House, the equal protection
clause has, especially in recent years, proved more than adequate.
Finally, the need for protection against national government action
beyond that specifically provided in the Bill of Rights could not be
found, by its terms, in the privileges or immunities clause which is di-
rected only toward restraints on the states rather than the national gov-
ernment. The Court has, therefore, apparently thought it better to
rely on the penumbrae of the first eight amendments, or even the
amorphousness of the ninth, rather than resort to the privileges or
immunities clause as a means for defining the rights of national citi-
zenship vis-a-vis the national government itself. The Court, it should
be noted, has not been wholly consistent in this regard. It managed
to incorporate the equal protection clause, also limited to restraint of
the states, within the due process clause of the fifth amendment.2" It
might equally have-and may yet-make privileges or immunities of
national citizenship a limitation on the national government in the
same way.
I. RECENT STIRRINGS
Perhaps the only certain content of the privileges or immunities of
national citizenship is what has come to be known as the right to
travel, between states and within them. This right was specifically
25. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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encompassed in the language of the Articles of Confederation,"0 from
there included by implication in the fourth article, from which it has
travelled to the fourteenth amendment. This reading is confirmed by
Justice Washington's opinion in Corfield v. Coryel27 and by the Court's
opinion in Twining v. New Jersey.2 It has been read into the holding
in Crandall v. Nevada.29 Four Justices, Black, Douglas, Murphy, and
Jackson, preferred the privileges or immunities clause over the com-
merce clause as the proper foundation for the right to travel in Cali-
fornia v. Edwards.30
More recently, the claim to a right to travel was established against
the national government by Aptheker v. Secretary of State,81 where the
Court rested its conclusion on the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. Reference was not made to the analogous use of the fifth
amendment's due process clause in Boiling v. Sharpe.3" But it might
have been.
The right to travel was again recognized by the Court in United
States v. Guest,33 this time to justify the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions by the national government on individuals who interfered with
other individuals' constitutional right to travel. Mr. Justice Stewart,
speaking for the Court, said: "The constitutional right to travel from
one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position
fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that
has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized. '3 4  He con-
cluded: "Although there have been necessary differences in emphasis
within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate
travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further. All
have agreed that the right exists." '35  Mr. Justice Harlan, in a separate
opinion both concurring and dissenting, did canvass the various bases
26. ART. CONFED. art. IV:
... and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to
and from any other State....
27. 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
28. 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
29. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
30. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
31. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
32. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
33. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
34. Id. at 757.
35. Id. at 759.
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for the right to travel. His conclusion was that the right to travel was
indeed a constitutional one, but enforceable only against the state or
national governments and not a right to be free from interference by
other individuals. 6
Aptheker and Guest, like Crandall and Edwards, dealt with the
right to travel simpliciter, the right not to be inhibited in travel by re-
quirements of improper conditions for the granting of a passport, by
a tax, by a penalty on state immigration, by physical force even when
exerted by individuals. A big step, a giant leap forward perhaps, was
taken in Shapiro v. Thompson, 7 where the Court created a derivative
right on the basis of the right to travel. Here the Court said that the
right to travel was unconstitutionally inhibited by a one-year residency
requirement for welfare recipients, a requirement imposed by the states
with the approval and sanction of the national government. The deci-
sion purported to rest on the equal protection clause. Mr. Justice Har-
lan's contention that the right to travel between states could be as-
serted only against the states and not the national government was re-
jected. The Court did not say that there was a constitutional right to
welfare, but it was only one step from doing so. And the means to
that end was the right to travel, a central ingredient of the privileges
and immunities of American citizens.
The implications of the Shapiro case were quickly picked up. Claims
against the states in terms of their obligations to provide not only
welfare, but education, voting privileges, and other services were framed
in terms of the right to travel. This Term of Court, a Tennessee resi-
dency requirement for voting was held invalid as a violation of the
constitutional right to travel.3 8 To the extent that these expansive no-
tions of the right to travel succeed, I submit, it means the quickening
of the heretofore moribund privileges or immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
If the slogan "right to travel" becomes a substitute for both the words
and the meaning of the Constitution, it will not be the first time that
ritual will have replaced judgment and reason as guides to constitu-
tional meaning. The Court in its behavior long anticipated the tech-
niques of Madison Avenue. Most of you are too young to remember
that "freedom of contract," language nowhere to be found in the four-
36. Id. at 762-74.
37. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
38. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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teenth amendment, resolved more cases than any words ever used by
the Founding Fathers or their constitution-writing successors. For, Mr.
Justice Holmes to the contrary notwithstanding,", Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics was in fact a part of our Constitution for a long period
of our history. Judgment by slogan has not declined since those
days of "substantive due process." Hard problems are disposed of by
the Court even today by the incantation of verbal formulae. Just think
of "one man, one vote"; "vague for voidness," as I have termed it;
"chilling effect"; and "the freezing principle"; "fundamental right" and
"compelling government interest." To these and the others may now
be added the euphemism of "the right to travel," which may, indeed,
become a euphemism for the applicability of the privileges or immu-
nities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
IV. LOOKING FORWARD
Admittedly, the right to travel cases are but acorns from which oaks
may be anticipated but only after long and tedious growth. My ex-
pectations for the privileges or immunities clause, however, are not
based on the development of the law that has already begun. My
prognosis rests rather on the existent and potential needs that the priv-
ileges or immunities clause may be able to meet.
The essential need for a new constitutional development, I submit,
is dependent on the proposition that constitutional law is not a cre-
ator of society but a creature of it. American society is rapidly moving
toward the condition in which individual judgments and actions govern
less and less of our behavior and formal and informal governments
secure more and more power over individual activities. We are, as
recent litigation has already indicated, becoming a society of classes,
even if not in the huge divisions of Marxist dogma. Lawsuits are
now more and more concerned with the rights of classes, not indi-
viduals; of consumers, or women, or blacks, or the aged, or the young.
In short, we are on the road back from contract to status. Concomi-
tant with this, government is assuming more and more power over,
and responsibility for, the creation and distribution of goods and serv-
ices. More and more an individual has no choice but that which the
government makes available to him. The kind of society to which the
former Mr. Justice Campbell pointed in horror in his argument in
Slaughter-House is upon us, for better or worse and perhaps even
39. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905) (dissenting opinion).
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for good. Moreover, we have arrived at the stage of technological de-
velopment that Orwell so graphically described in his, to me, still
shocking novel, 1984. The problem of freedom is essentially the prob-
lem of avoiding the consequences of that technology so that Orwell's
vision might, despite our technological achievements, be frustrated.
With government in control of so many essentials of our life, where
in the Constitution can we turn for haven against the impositions of
1984? Until now, we have looked to the Bill of Rights, substantive
due process, and substantive equal protection. But nowhere in these
provisions is there a basis for claims to privileges and immunities that
will become more and more necessary. With all due respect to those
who have labored so hard in the vineyard, equal educational oppor-
tunity is not the essence of the claim. It is not equality but quality
with which we are concerned. For equality can be secured on a low
level no less than a high one. The claim that will have to be developed
will be a claim to adequate and appropriate educational opportunity.
And this, I submit, derives more cogently from concepts of privileges
and immunities rather than equality of treatment. So, too, with the
budding claim of right to what has heretofore been known as welfare
services, health services, police protection, and a myriad of other goods
and services of which the government, national, state, and local, has
control directly or indirectly. These, too, are claims which, I think,
will best be stated in terms of the privileges and immunities of citizens.
Even "women's lib" is more likely to find support in privileges and
immunities than in the new constitutional amendment, which is more
likely to succor men than women. But most of all, I should hope to
find among the privileges and immunities of citizenship, that most
fundamental of rights, still without a base in the Constitution, the right
that Mr. Justice Brandeis called, "the right to be let alone."40
The objections to the use of the privileges or immunities clause-its
limitation to claims against states and its limitation to protection of
citizens-have already been overcome. Aptheker and Boiling v.
Sharpe and Shapiro v. Thompson have shown how the national gov-
ernment may be called on to respond to claims which the fourteenth
amendment in terms makes only against state action. The equal pro-
tection clause has already required that classifications be rationalized
so that differences in treatment between aliens and citizens would have
to be particularly justified.
40. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv. L. Rav. 193 (1890).
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If I read the political scene correctly, the Supreme Court and com-
pany, to use Paul Freund's phrase,41 is the lone element of national
government committed to the individual. Although or because it is
non-representative, it is not responsible to the groups and classes that
make up the constituencies of the legislative and executive branches
of government and of the so-called independent agencies as well. It is
the judiciary, therefore, that will be called upon, sooner or later, to de-
fine and protect the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens in a
highly organized service state. I am far from certain that it vill turn
to the privileges or immunities clause to bring about the results that it
will command. But there the clause is, an empty and unused vessel
which affords the Court full opportunity to determine its contents with-
out even the need for pouring out the precedents that already clog the
due process and equal protection clauses. In short, if the legislative
and executive discretion is to be limited by the Constitution on such
matters as public education, public welfare, and public housing; police,
fire, and sanitation; ecology; and, to repeat, most importantly, with
reference to the right of privacy, I expect it will come as an attempt to
define the privileges or immunities of American citizenship.
In Edwards v. California, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote:
This clause was adopted to make United States citizenship the dom-
inant and paramount allegiance among us. The return which the law
had long associated with allegiance was protection. The power of
citizenship as a shield against oppression was widely known from the
example of Paul's Roman citizenship, which sent the centurion scurry-
ing to his higher-ups with the message: "Take heed what thou doest;
for this man is a Roman." I suppose none of us doubts that the hope
of imparting to American citizenship some of this vitality was the pur-
pose of declaring in the Fourteenth Amendment: "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States
"42
With all due respect to Professor Karst, I hope that, in Mr. Justice
Jackson's terms, we are Romans all.
41. P. FREUND, ON UNDERSTAMDNG nTE SUPREME CoURT 78-79 (1949).
42. 314 U.S. 160, 182 (1941).
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